On the Divergence in Unionism among Developed Countries by Richard B. Freeman
NRER  WORKiNG  PAPER  SERIES 
ON  TILE  DIVERGENCE  IN UNIONISM AMONG  DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Richard  Freeman 
Working Paper No. 2817 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
1050 Massachusetts Avenue 
Cambridge, MA  02138 
January 1989 
This research is part of  NBER's research program in Labor Studies.  Any 
opinions expressed are those of  the author not those of  the National Bureau 
of Economic Research. NBER Working Paper e2811 
January 1989 
ON  THE DIVERGENCE IN UNIONISM AMONG DEVElOPED COUNTRIES 
ABSTRACT 
In  this paper I explore the evolution of unionism in the 1970n and 1980s, 
when the post—oil shuck world economy created a  crisis ef  unionists'  through— 
sut the western world.  I try to explain why union representation ot work forces 
tell  in some countries but nut in others and contrast union responses to the 
challenge of the period.  I find that: 
—  Rates  of unionisation diverged greatly among developed countries 
—  The  composition  of  union members shifted from private sector blue collar 
workers to puhlic sector end white collar  workers in all countries, producing in- 
creased divisions within union movements by  category of  worker 
—  Changes  in  the  industrial  composition  of  employment,  changes  in  public 
attitudes  toward  unionism,  and  the  growth  of  governmental  protection  of  labor 
do not explain the divergence  in density 
—  Differing rates of inflation contributed to the divergence, with  unions 
doing better in countries with high inflation.  In addition, unemployment 
raised density in settings where unions disperse unemployment benofits 
—  The  primary  reason  for  the  divergence  are  differences  in  the  incentives 
and  opportunities  different  industrial  relations  systems  give  employers  to  op- 
pose  unions.  Unions  fared  best  in nee—corperarist settings snd worst  in settings 
vhere decentralised bargaining  creates a strong profit incentive for managers to 
oppose unions and where management is relatively free to act on that incentive 
—  Union  organizations and modes of  operating changed significantly in some 
countries with declining or endangered unionism but not in others 
Most strikingly, my  analysis indicates that if 1980s trends continue the 
west will be divided between countries with strong trade union movements operating 
in a neo—corporatist  system, as in Scandinavia, and countries vith 'ghetrn 
unionism' limited to special segments of the work force, as in the United States. 
Richard Freeman 
National Bureau of  Economic Researoh 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In this  paper I explore the  evolution of  unionism in lNlOs and l98Os when 
rite post-oil  shock world economy created a "crisis of unionism  throughout the 
western world.  I  try to explain why union representation of work  forces fell 
in some countries but  not in others and contrast union responses to the 
challenge of the period.  I find that: 
I) Rates of unionisation diverged greatly among developed countries 
(Section 2.1) 
2) The composition of  union members shifted from private sector blue collar 
workers to public sector and  white collar  workers in all countries, producing 
increased divisions within union movements by  category of  worker. (Section 2.2) 
3) Changes in the industrial composition of employment,  changes in  public 
attitudes toward unionism, and  the growth of  governmental protection of labor 
do not explain the divergence  in density (Section 3.1) 
4) Differing rarem of  inflation contributed to  the divergence,  with unions 
doing better in countries with high inflation.  In  addition, unemployment 
raised density in settings where unions disperse unemployment benefits. 
(Section 3.2;  section 3.5) 
5)  The primary reason for the divergence are  differences in the 
incentives and opportunities different industrial relations systems give 
employers to oppose unions.  Unions fated  best  in  neo-corporatist settings and 
worst in settings  where decentralised bargaining creates a strong profit 
incentive for managers to oppose unions and where msnageeent is relatively free 
to act on that incentive. (Section 3.3;  Section 3.5) 
6) Union organizations and modes of operating changed significantly in some 
countries with  declining or endangered unionism but not in others.(Section 3.4) Most strikingly, my  analysis indicates that ii l980s trends continue the 
west will he divided between countries with strong trade union movements 
operating in  a  neo-corpotatiat system, as in Scandinavia, and countries with 
'ghetto unionism' limited to special segments  of the  work  force, as in the U.S. 
2 CHANCES IN  UNIONISM ANONO  DEVEIDFED COUNTRIES 
In contrast  to business firms, which behave similarly in all capitalist 
countries, maximizing profits or somethtng close akin, trade unions have a 
"national" dimension, operating under distinct institutional arrangements 
across countries.  In  the United States unions  negotiate detailed collective 
bargaining contracts with fires; in  Sweden they are involved in  national wage- 
setting and nee-corporatist social agreements; in  Australia they argue wage 
cases before arbitration tribunals; in  France they negotiate industry or 
regional minima that are extended to entire sectors; in  Japan they represent 
workers at  the company level and organize tha Shunre offensive; etc.  Separated 
by  national barriers, union  movements are like distinct species of animals, 
developing differently in  some  dimensions even in  similar economic and 
technological environments.  In the 1970s and  1980s  the union representation of 
workers underwent particularly dramatic  changes across  developed countries, 
rising in some countries to  reach virtually complete organiaarion of the  work 
force,  while  falling sharply in other countries.  At  the same time the 
composition of unionised  labour underwent similar changes across  countries, as 
the white collar and public  sector worker share of  union members rose while the 
manual and private sector manufacturing workers share of members fell. 
2.1 Divergence  in Union Density 
The first and seemingly simplest fact to establish is the claimed 
divergence  in union density among countries.  Because counts of union 
membership include  large numbers of the unemployed  or of  peosioners  in some countries but not in others; come from diverse sources -  -  labor  force surveys, 
reports by  unions, employer surveys, union financial records (see Eurostat for 
a detailed comparison of  union data by country); and reflect differences in 
what unions do in different settings, however, the seemingly simple is fraught 
with problems.  As examples of  the difficulties in  cross-country comparisons 
note the following: in  Australia unions represent virtually all workers before 
the tribunals that formally set wages but enlist only half of the work force; 
in France and Germany unions have a  larger role in wage-setting than density 
figures indicate because agreements between representative employers and unions 
are legally extended to other employers; in Italy the growth of autonomous 
union groups in  the public sector and of quadri among foremen and  lower level 
management makes membership data from the  major confederations an  incomplete 
indicator of  union organisation (Minestero del L.avoro  e della Previdenza 
Sociale, 1988).  These and  other data/conceptual problems mean that even the 
most careful estimates of density provide only crude indicators of cross- 
country differences in  union strength and must be informed  by direct knowledge 
of institutions so as not to be  misleading. 
This said, exhibit 1  records estimates of  the union proportion of  non- 
agricultural wage and salary  workers in OECD countries from 1970 to the mid- 
1980s.  While comparisons of  changes in  density over time are less likely to be 
distorted by  cross-country differences than are comparisons of  levels, even the 
trends are not problem free.  The United Kingdom figures understate  the l980s 
decline in  British density as some unions exaggerated membership to maintain 
high representation in  the Trade Union Congress and Labor Party.  The American 
data mix two opposing trends: a disastrous drop in  private sector density and a 
spurt  in public sector unionism.  The Italian data may overstate the 1980s drop 
due  to absence of membership outside the three confederations. Measurement  issues notwithstanding, exhibit 1 shows a  divergence in 
dansities that is unlikely to change with batter data.  From 1970 to 1919 
density increased in most countries, rising 10 or  so  points in several, but 
fell in the United States, Japan, and Austria.  From 1919 to 1985/86 density 
dropped in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and  Italy as well as in the 
U.S.  and Japan while stabilizing in most other countries.  Two decades of 
decline make the U.S. and Japan the centers of  de-unionisation, greatly 
reducing their share of  union membership in the West.  In 1970 42% of  all union 
members of  the countries in the  exhibit were American or  Japanese.  In 1985/86, 
despite an increase in  the  American and  Japanese share of  wage and salary 
workers from 50% to 54% the two countries accounted for only 34% of  union 
members, (1) As  a  result of  the  different trends in unionisation, the 
coefficient of  variation of  density rose from .31  in  1970 to .39  in  1985/86. 
Note, finally, that density changed differently  between pairs of  countries 
with similar industrial relations systems -  -  the United States and  Canada; the 
United Kingdom and  Ireland,  Netherlands and Belgium -- indicating that the 
diverging trends represent more than disparate development of  greatly different 
forms of  unionism.  The differing evolution of  unions between close pairs 
suggests that relatively modest differences in industrial relations laws and 
institutions can  significantly affect the evolution of  unionism. 
2.2 membership  composition 
Despite differing trends, the composition of  union membership in virtually 
all countries ahifted in the 1970a and  1980s from the  blue  collar  private 
sector workers who  constituted the vast majority of  members in earlier decades 
to public sector workers and  in  some countries to  white collar private sector 
workers as  well (see exhibit 2).  In the United States, where the public sector 
was viewed as  unorganizable in  the 1950s and 1960s, state and  local legislation 
legalizing public sector collective bargaining spurted huge  increases in union Countries w/1970'a 
Rises  in Density/ 
Stable in 1980's 


















SOURCE:  U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics 
London School of  Economics OECD  Data Set, 
relevant Country Statistical Abstracts 
a  Visser excludes pensioners,  and reports: 
55% in 1970, 69% in 1979, and 74% in  1983. 
b  Visser  reports densities of 26,  24,  and 21, 
which would put France in declining density. 
EXHIBIT  12  Levels and Changes in  Union Membership  as a Percent ot  Non- 
Agricultural Wage and Salary Employees Across Countries, 
1970—1986. 
Countri.. with  Sharp 
Rises  in Density  1970  1979  1985186  1970—79  1979—86  1970—66 
Denmark  66  86  95  +20  +9  29 















37  42  43  + 5 
22  28  ——  +6 
32  36  36  + 4 
52  58  56  +6 
43  46  ——  + 3 
44  49  51  + 5 
31  34  33  + 3 
59  60  61  +1 
+1  6 
0  4 
—1  5 
——  3 
+2  7 
—l  2 
+1  2 
39  51  45  +12  —6  6 
51  58  51  +7  —7  0 
64  59  61  —5  +2  —3 
35  32  28  — 3  —4  — 7 
39  43  35  + 4  —8  — 4 
31  25  17  — 6  —8  —14 
updated using Exhibit 2:  Public Sector and Private Sector Blue Collar Shares 
of Union Membership, by  Country 
Country  Private Sector  Change  Public Sector Share  Change 
Blue Collar Share  of  Union Members 
1970  1980a  1970  1980s 
United Stares  67  56  -13  14  36  22 
United Kingdom  55  45  -10  34  39  5 
Japan 
- -  -  -  29  29  - - 
Canada 
- -  - -  - -  26  45  19 
Germany  54  48  -  6  33  35  2 
Italy  65  55  -10  18  24  6 
Sweden  45  32  -13  36  44  B 
Austria  52  44  -  8  33  35  2 
Netherlands  51  39  -12  37  46  9 
Switzerland  50  46  - 4  29  30  1 
Source: U.S.,  1980s from U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics, 1988 
1970, from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1972. where I 
estimate the private sector blue collar  union memebets by  subtracting public 
sector members outside public administration and  services from blue collar. 
Japan, from Japan Ministry of  Labor,  Match 1,  1971 and April 1,  1985 
Canada, 1970 is 1971 from Wood and Kumar (1977); 1980s from Kumar 
(1986).  I have  taken union workers in public administration plus 89% of  those 
in  the services (—education  and health and welfare share of union members in 
services in  1986) as  estimate of  union membership in government jobs. 
All  others, from Visser 1985 membership  and collective bargaining representation (Freeman  and  Ichniowski, 
1988)  with  dramatic effects on the public  sector share  of unionists  due to  the 
decline  in  private sector membership.  In countries like  Denmark and Sweden, 
where blue collar private sector organisation rates were high at the outset of 
the period, growth wam necessarily concentrated aeong public aector and white 
collar workers.  In  Canada, public sector membership expanded rapidly, partly 
as a result of favorable public aector labor laws, while private sector density 
drifted downward.  One reason for the incraased attractivenaaa of  unions to 
public aector and white collar workers wam a perception that they needed unions 
to maintain real wages during the l9lOa rapid inflation.  Once established, 
moreover, public sector membership tends to be  more stable than private sector 
membership due to the stability of public employment. 
The shift to white collar and public sector membership  has  begun to change 
the face of  union movements traditionally  dominated by industrial workers.  In 
the U.S.  the locus of  power in the  AFL-CIO  ia shifting to public sector 
organizations while the non-affiliated National gducarion Association has 
achieved considerable national influence.  In Italy the new  autonomous public 
aector organizations and quadri pose a  challenge to the three traditional 
confederations,  In Sweden and Denmark the white collar unions have shown an 
increasing willingneaa to develop their own  economic  agenda rather than to 
follow the lead of blue collar manufacturing unions. 
3 REASONS FOR THE  DIVERGENCE 
Several hypotheses can  be advanced for explaining the divergence in 
density: changes in  the composition of  employment, in attitudes toward 
unionism, and in governmental protection of  labor which reduce  worker desires 
to organise; macro-economic developments; management opposition to unionism; 
and differential responses of  union movements to the problems of  the period. 3.1 Structural Explanations 
One oftan suggested explanation for changing unionismtion ara differonrial 
changas in  rho composition of employment among jobs or  workors, which in  tho 
1970s and  1980s took tha form of a  shift toward traditionally loss unionizod 
araas.  In countrias where employment shifted rapidly froa manual to white 
collar jobs, from goods to service industries,  from small to large firms, and 
from female to male or from less educated to more educated workers, unions are, 
after all, likely to have greater difficulties organizing than in  countries 
where those shifts occur more slowly. 
The  ahift hypothesis does nor, however, stand up to scrutiny.  Shifts in 
the composition of  employment cannot explain divergent country experiences 
because shifts have occurred similarly across countries: the share of 
employment in  manufacturing fell, for  example,  by roughly as  much in  high  and 
increasing density Sweden, Canada, or  Denmark as  in  the de-unionising U.S. or 
Japan. (2)  Contrary to the shift  hypothesis, moreover, large changes in union 
representation are accompanied by  changes in density within sectors, as exhibit 
3  demonstrates for  countries with declining unionism. 
A  second possible explanation for diverging union density is that public 
opinion of  unions has come to differ greatly among countries.  Perhaps density 
is declining in countries where the public has less favorable attitudes and 
increasing/stabilizing in  those where the public has more favorable attitudes. 
Lipset (1986), for one,  has argued that reduced public approval is a  major 
cause of  the decline in  American union density. 
I  reject this hypothesis as inconsistent with within-country and cross- 
country and evidence.  Pirar, there is little relation within countries between 
changes in opinion po11s and in union density.  Polls for the U.K. show that 
attitudes toward unionism  became more favorable during the 1980s decline in 
unionism; while those for the  U.S. show public approval of  unions steady between 1972 and 1965 when  density fell sharply in the private  sector and rose 
in the public sector, where public opinion ought to be  especially important.(3) 
Moreover, for what it is worth, cross-country opinion poll data show no 
substantial differences in approval of  unions between countries with decreasing 
density and those with stable density: "polls show about a 33 percent 
(confidence) in the Unitad States  .  higher  than in Britain (26 percent> and 
Italy (32 percent) and  scarcely worse then German and  France (both 36 percent)" 
(Hacksher, 1988, 258).  Perhaps most strikingly,  comparisons of opinion polls 
between the United States and  Canada show that Canadians have,  if anything, 
less favorable attitudes toward unions than Americans (Chaison and  Rose, 1988>, 
which runs counter to the decline in  density in  the  United States and  stable 
density in  Canada. 
A  third possibility 
is that the divergence results from differential 
changes in worker need for unionism among countries.  Perhaps goverruuental 
protection of  labor  increased more in some countries than others, offering a 
substitute for unionism  (Neuman and  Rissisan  (1986)  argue that  this explains 
the decline of  unions in  the United States).  Perhaps wages and personnel 
practices improved more in some countries than in others, offering a substitute 
for unionism. 
There is compelling evidence against this hypothesis.  First, unionism has 
remained strong in Scandinavia and other European countries with highly 
regulated markets while  losing strength in the  United States under Reagan and 
in the United Kingdom under Thatcher -- the opposite of  what one would expect 
if governmental regulations substitute for union protection at work  places. 
Within-country evidence is also inconsistent  with the government substitution 
hypothesis:  in the United States unions have done no  worse in  states with the 
greatest legal protection of  labor than in those with the least (Freeman. 1987; 
Block, Mahoney, and  Corbitt, 1987).  At a conceptual level the argument that EXHIBIT 31 
Change. in  Union Density by  Sectors  U.S., Canada  and Japan 
United States  Canada 
1973/5  1986  A  1975  1984  A  1975  1986  A 
Total  29  18  —11  35  37  2  34  28  —6 
Manufacturing  37  24  —13  49  45  —4  40  33  —7 
Construction  38  22  —16  63  39  —24  18  19  1 
Transportation, 
Communication  50  35  —15  56  60  4  66  56  —10 
&  Utilities 
Service  7  6  —1  15  38  23  26  19  —7 
Mining  35  18  —17  47  33  —14  41  42  —1 
Trade  11  7  —4  9  13  4 
Finance, 
Insurance  &  4  3  1  1  9  8  20  18  —2 
Real Estate 
Governsent  24  36  12  73  67  —6  67  69  2 
SOURCE:  U.S.  1973/5:  Richard  B. Freeman and James Hedoff  (1979) 
with government estimated from  May 1973-75 
Current Population Survey  Tapes. 
U.S.  1986:  U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics, Jan.1988. 
Canada:  Pradeep Kunar,  "The Current Industrial 
Relations Scene in  Canada:  1986"  (Queens 
Univ, Kingston, Canada) 
Japan 
1970 & 1986:  Japan Ministry of  Labor,  Basic Survey of 
Trade Unions.  ?oreian  Labor  Trends. 11 
unionism and governaent regulation are substitutes is flawed because it fails 
tu recognize that "enacting a  law and securing rhe realization of  the purpose 
the law is aimed  to secure are two vastly different matters"  (Compers,  1965,  p. 
54).  To  bonef  it from legal regulation workers need a union or  union-like 
sgency to monitor compliance at the shop hoot.  As  for the substitution of 
good employment prectices for unionise, while high wages and positive 
industrial relations can  deter uoioniaetion, the large firas that pay  above- 
market wages and  have progressive human resources policies 
- -  of which IBM is 
the exsmplar -  -employ similar moderate and declining proportions of work forces 
in industrial economies (OECD, 1986).  Changes in union density  are,  moreover, 
oncorrelated with  levels or changes in real wages across countries, contrary to 
what one would expect if high or  improving pay reduced the desire for unions 
(4). 
If none of the above explains the divergence in  density, what does? 
3.2  MACRo-ECONOMIC FACTORS 
One likely factor is the differing macro-economic experiences of countries, 
On the basis of  studies of  the cyclical pattern of  union growth, high 
unemployment, low inflation, and slow economic growth ought to reduce unionism 
while the opposite conditions should increase  density. (5) 
To  explore this hypothesis I  contrast in exhibit 4 the growth of  employment 
and GOP per  capita, the rate of  inflation, and the rate of unemployment between 
countries with increasing, decreasing, and roughly stable union density.  The 
results are, with the exception of  inflation, rather mixed.  Rapid inflation is 
associated with union growth, presumably because nonunion workers see a  need 
for contractual arrangements to preserve real earnings.  Employment growth is 
higher in declining union density countries while growth of COP  per capita and 
most strikingly, unemployment rates do not differ noticeably.  As  will be  shown 1J 
r:xui  1111  4:  bc,o—i:conoii  c  iii fferences i,v Co,i,,L El  ES 
iii, iii ffere,,t Chantes  in  tin ion  tens  (V 
1980-  1985/i, 
DECI.INING  "STABLF  RISING 
DINSITY  DEUSITY'  IThNSITY 
Change  in  Log 
Retail  Prices 
1980—85  ________________________________________ 
.24  .37  .43 
Change  in  Log  ________ 
£ployment 
1980—85 
.02  .02  -.01 
Change in  Log 
GDP/capita 
1980—85  I  I 
.04  .02  .04 
Unemployment Rate 
I  1  Average,  1980-85  _________________________________________________ 
.05  .08 
NOTES:  Figures  are  averages  for  Countries. 
Declining  Density  Countries  defined  as  United  States,  Japan, 
United  Kingdom,  Netherlands. 
Increasing  Density  Countries  defined  as  Denmark,  Sweden, 
Belgium,  Ireland. 
Other  Countries:  all  others  from  Exhibit  1. 13 
in Exhibit 6 these patterns or lack of  patterns hold up in multivariate 
regressions  covering longer periods of  time,  the lack of  a linear  relation 
between unemployment and changes in density is partly attributable to the 
concordance of high unemployment and increased union density in Belgium and 
Denmark -  -  two countries where for historical reasons unions disperse 
government-funded unemployment benefits (as in  Sweden and Finland), inducing 
workers who lose jobs to maintain or join unions in periods of increasing 
unemployment. 
3.3 MANACEMKNT OPPOSITION TO UNIONISM 
The factor that, I believe, explains best the  divergence in union 
experiences are differential changes in  the difficulty of  organising new 
workers due to changes in  the level and effectiveness of management opposition 
to unionism.  Here, the rapidly de-uniontaing  United States is the prima facie 
case of  what aggressive management can  do  to  unionism.  In  the 1910s and 1980s 
U.S. management turned against unions and collective bargaining to a  degree not 
seen anywhere else in the free world.  Virtually all firms that faced National 
Labor Relations Board representation elections (the government-run secret 
ballot process by  which American workers can choose to unionise) engaged in 
expensive aggressive campaigns to persuade/pressure workers to reject  unions. 
Unfair labor practices of  diverse forms (including firing upwards of a thousand 
union activists in a  year) skyrocketed to rates five or six times those in 
aarller decades.  Large nonunion firms  consciously copied union seniority and 
grievance procedures to deter employee interest in  unions.  Forty-five percent 
of  the relatively progressive firms in the Conference Board's Personnel Forum 
declared in 1983 that  operating 'union-free'  was  their main labor goal (Kochan, 
McKersie, and Chalykoff, 1986) 
- -  a far cry from the 1950s and 1960s when most 
large firms accepted unions at  the work place.  Even when workers voted to 14 
unioniae, moreover, management avoided a  first contract in one-third of ihe 
cases, effectively negating the election.  On  the basis of diverse studies that 
show management opposition to  have been a  major  factor in  the failure of  unions 
to organism in  the period (Freeman, 1985),  moat analysts have come to believe 
that it is a, if not the, major cause of the decline in private aeccor density. 
Why  did American management declare war on  unions?  One reason is that 
unionism became more costly to firma.  It became more costly because the union 
wage premium rose In the 1970a  (Freeman, 1986) end because growth of  trade, 
deregulation, and other factors increased product market competition, making it 
more difficult to pay  above-market wages.  A  second reason is the growth of  a 
militant market-oriented ideology that juatified virtually any anti-union 
action as  preserving managerial  flexibility.  A  third reason is the 
development of  a  sophisticated union-prevention technology that exploits the 
opportunities U.S. labor laws give management to campaign against unions.  In 
Canada, where labor law limits management's ability to fight unions, often by 
certifying  unions after card checks, many of  the same firms that go all  out to 
defeat unions in  the U.S. accept unionisation of their Canadian plants. 
Is management opposition important in  other countries with rapidly 
declining density? 
In  the  United Kingdom, the principal cause of  the l980s drop in  density 
appears to be the Thatcher government's industrial relations laws, which 
shifted the balance of  power at  workplaces to management and  weakened  the 
ability of  unions to organime. (Freeman  and Pelletier, 1989)  While management 
opposition to unionism ham not taken the form or virulence shown in  the U.S. 
the new features of  the law  have enhanced resistance to union activities. 
In Japan, government and  management opposition have played a  major role in 
the drastic loss of  membership of  Kokuro, the militant union of  now  privatized 15 
Japanese National Railway.  Once the latgest taitway union with over 500,000 
meobers, in 1988 it had only 62,000 members due to management's union busting 
tactics. (Nagashima, 1988)  Similarly, the Japanese Teachers Union has suffered 
major losses of membership due in  part to government efforts to discourage 
newly-hired teachers from joining the  union.  More importantly, data on the 
number of workers newly organised shows a  pattern remarkably like that in the 
United States, with  the bulk of  the drop in unionism attributable to a 
precipitous fall in union organisation of  new  workers relative to the growing 
work force. The drop in  new organisation occurred after the oil shock placed 
severe economic pressures on  Japanese employers, was accompanied by  changes in 
court interpretation of  lehour law  favorable to managssent,  and  was concentrated 
in  industries facing the greatest profits squeeze (Freeman and Rebbick, 1989) 
Civen the close ties between companies and unions in  an  enterprise union 
system, and the role of  white  collar  employees in company unions, I  find it 
hard  to believe that changes in  company attitudes toward unionism has not 
played a  role in  the inability of  unions to organism new  workplaces. 
In  Italy and the Netherlands, management opposition of the  American or 
milder British type would appear to have little to do  with the observed 
changes.  The l980s decline in density in  Italy has bean attributed to the 
disorganisation of  the union movement that developed after 1983.  The 1980s 
decline in density in  the Netherlands may  be largely the result of the high 
unemployment that devaloped in  the  mid-1910s and persisted for over a  decade. 
What about management behavior in countries where union density reached 
unprecedented peaks in the period  under study?  If  differences in management 
opposition contributed to the divergence,  one would expect less opposition in 
those countries, either because firms have little profit incentive to avoid 
unionism or  little legal or institutional  opportunity to express opposition. 16 
The  prime factor that appears to reduce the profit incentive to fight 
unions is centralized wage negotiations.  In  countries where unions and 
management engage in  national bargaining -  - so-called  neo-corporatist systecs -  - 
managementa  form  employers'  federations  to establish going national wages and 
often presaure nonunion firms to recognize unions, presumably to assure that 
they pay the going rate.  The  notion that business should engage in a  jihad for 
union-free environment as in  the  United States is anathema to employers in such 
a  setting.  Unionism has accordingly fared well, with density increasing in the 
1970s and l9BOs aven though  density was already high at  the outset of  both 
periods (exhibit 5). 
Countries where the state extends collective contracts to nonunion firms 
such as  Germany and  France and  where workers are represented by  works councils 
(much of  Western Europe) might also appear to give employers little reason to 
oppose unions at  the plant level.  Here, however, the likelihood that plant- 
level agreements will go  beyond representative contracts suggests that 
employers will be  more opposed to unions than in neo-corporstist settings.  In 
fact, unionisation trends in  Germany and in  France (as  best  one csn tell from 
available data) are intermediate between those of  the U.S., U.K. in  the 
Thatcher era, and  Japan end the  neo-corpormtist countries. 
Finally, the growth/stability of unionism in Canada and in Ireland shows 
that even in  industrial relations systems where management has  a  substantial 
profit incentive to oppose unions legsl restrictions on  opposition can  produce 
developments that differ from those in  neighboring  countries (U.S.  end U.K.) 
where the laws are less favorable to  organisation. I) 










Source:  Corporatist countries taken  from Crouch. 
They include:  Austria, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany. 
"Corporatist"  "Non  -Corporat  1st' 3.4  UNION RESPONSE 
Another likely cause for diverging union densities are cross-country 
differences in  union responses to economic changes.  Sidestepping wege setting 
(most uoion movements moderated wage demands relative to inflation for the sake 
of job security or to reduce unemployment) and strike  hehavior  (strike daya 
lost fell in the l980a in all countries) there  was a  wide rango of union 
organizational responses to the crisis of  the l970s/80s. 
The Australian union movement made pethsps the most dramatic adjustment to 
the new  economic environment.  After careful study of the German and Swedish 
experiences, the Australian Council of  Trade Unions (ACTU) sought to ttansfotm 
Australian  industrial  relations from a  confronrational British-style system to 
a  neo-corporatiat system, in  part to preempt growing anti-union management 
sentiment that might fuel ILS. or  U.K. type losses of  membership.  In  the mid 
1980s the Secretary-Treasurer of  the  ACTU  was  doing  him  beat to convince 
constituent unions to accept a  national wages accord that required aome unions 
to take lnwër wage settlements than they could otherwise get. 
The American labor movement reacted more sluggishly.  In  the 1970s many top 
AFL-CIO leaders downplayed felling density on  the grounds that absolute 
membership was stable end that an  economic  boom would cute all.  In 1978 the 
Federation tried but failed to get a  modest labor law reform bill.  It was nmt 
until 1985 that top leadership aounded alarm  bells with  "The Changing 
Situation of  Workers and their Unions" report.  Since then national unimns have 
been slew to  adopt the "evolutionary blueprint" laid out in the report.  While 
many now  offer union Mastercards with attractively low rates of interest for 
their members (McDonald,  1987) few have actively pursued the key recoronendation 
to create new  forms of  membership outside the collective bargaining structure. 
A  major reason for the  slow adaption is the  decentralized structure of 19 
organized labor, which consists of some 90 or so independent  national unions in 
the AFL-CIO; others outside the federation; and hundreds of independent  locals 
within the national unions.  Each national and local has its own concerns, 
guaranteeing slow response to prohlems chat affect  unionism in  general and 
making problematic implementation of  reforms recoumsended  by the  AFL-CIO. 
In  the United Kingdom there has been a similar effort to devise new 
benefits  (of the U.S. mastercard type)  to attract workers.  There hmva also, 
however, been more dramatic changes in industrial relations practices in some 
sectors: the Miners Union split; the  Electricians and Engineering unions have 
developed cooperative single  plant/singla union bargaining strategies; tha 
Boilermakers, among othars, have sought to enlist  pert-time workers.  The big 
organizational change is, however, be the splitting of the Trade Union Congress 
when  it  revoked membership of  the Electricians in Sapteebar 1988, 
In  some other countries where unions have been in  trouble, there have been 
structural changes in union organizations.  In  Japan, two federations, Dcmei 
and Churitsu Roren, have dissolved and their private sector  unions have formed 
the new  federation Rengo to break free from the more politicized public sector 
unions.  Sohyo plans to dissolve itself in 1990.  Tn  Italy, the three majpr 
confederations, which united briefly in  the early l980a,  separated to  engage in 
competitive recruiting efforts, each with its  own  style and  selling points. 
3,5 regression analysis 
To estimate the quantitative impact of  some of  the aformentioned factors on 
cross-country changes in  union density. I pooled data on  density and  its 
determinants across 18 developed OECD countries for the period 1913-1985 and 
estimated a  regression model linking changes (d)  in density (DENS)  to: a  dummy 
variable for corporatist industrial  relations (CORE);  the rate of inflation 
(INF); changes in  the uneoployment rate (ONE); a dummy variable for  union 
delivery of  unemployment benefits interacted with changes in the unemployment 20 
rate (Ul*dUNE); and selected other variables (Z).  Because density is bounded 
betweeo 0  and I  I use a log odds ratio form as  well as a  linear form: 
dDENS or  dln(DENS/l-DENS) —  a  +  bINF +  cdUNE +  Ul*dUNE  +  eCORP + fZ + u, 
where Z —  set  of  variables that includes  growth of employment and growth of COP 
per  capita and  a  vecror of  dummy variables for individual  years.  Controlling 
for individual years removes common cyclical  variation from the data to locus 
on  the cross-country differences of  concern. 
The regression estimates summarized in exhibit 6  show that, consistent with 
the simpler tabulations given earlier, density grew more in  countries with 
corporetist industrial relations; with rising  unemployment when unions deliver 
unemployment benefits; and with rapid inflation. 
4  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This study baa shown that, contrary to the view that industrial relations 
converges as countries develop (Kerr,  Dunlop, I4arbison,  end  Meyers). union 
density diverged among developed countries in  the 1970m and l9BOs.  As  all  of 
the countries are advanced capitalist economies undergoing similat economic 
changes, the divergence implies that relatively modest differences in the 
institutions thef govern labor relations extort e substantial influence on  the 
evolution of  unionism.  The  decline in  union density in  the United States and 
Japan, where unions were thought to be  parr of the established order, furthur 
implies that private sector unionism is a  more fragile institution than is 
widely recognized.  The  broad implication is that in a  world of  economic and 
social flux the structuring of labor relations is not a  once-and-for-all 
process of  setting up  procedures and insrirurions.  Rather, it is a process 
that must be  undertaken time and again as  environinentml  changes alter the 
balance of  power barween workers and  management and  their conflicting and 
coincident interests.  Therm  is no rear in  rho practice or  study of industrial 
relations. 21 
EXHIBIT  6:  Impact of  Corporatism, Inflation, and Changing 
Employment on Annual Growth  of Percent Unionized 
1970—1985 
SOURCE:  Calculated from  London School of  Economics, 
Center for Labour Economics OECD  Data Set 
Countries where unions  give benefits: 
Denmark, Belgium, Sweden end Finland 
Corporate Countries, as in  Exhibit 5. 
Explanatory  Variables  Dependent Variables 
Change  in  Change  in Log Odds 
%  Union  Ratio of % Union 
•j.atatist'  4" .prnthesi" 
.005 (2.53)  .036 (3.61) 
.065 (2.60)  .406 (2.99) 
—.109  (0.77)  —.655 (0.83) 
(Mean in oarenthemis 
Corporatism  (.48) 
Inflation  (.079) 
Change  in  Unemployment  (.003) 
Change  in Unemployment if 
Unions  Give  Benefits (.0009)  .823 (4.19)  6.31  (5.81) 
Growth of  GNP  (.028)  —.054  (1.18)  —.19  (  .74) 
Time  —.001 (5.30)  —.004 (3.26) 
R—Squared  .23  .25 
Number  of  Observations  259  259 22 
Endnotes 
-  - I calculated the coefficient of  variation for 1985/86 using 1919 densities 
for Belgium, France,  and New Zealand.  The average deosity for the top six 
countries was  65% in 1910 and 79% in 1985/86 while the average density for the 
bottom six countries was 31% in 1910 and 30% in 1985/86.  1 calculated the 
United Stares and Japanese shares of  wage and salary employees using the data 
from the Center for Labour Economics, OECD Data set, updated, and with union 
figures based as ouch as  possible on the  U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics data. 
The calculation is crude, using figures for the year closest to 1985 for 
countries wirh missing data. 
2  -  - OECD  data show that the shift of employment out of  manufacturing, was 
actually larger in  OECD Eureps than in  the  de-unionising United States.  See 
OECD Nistorical Statistics (Paris 1986). 
3 -- The  rise  in  favorable  ratings  of  unions in the UK  is documented in 
Financial  Tine's, November 18,1987.  Data on  approval of unions in the  United 
States are given by  Lipaet (1988).  Because the U.S. figures are from two 
separate surveys they are not atrictly comparable. 
4 -  -  This  claim is based en correlating changes in real wages and in density 
using the LSE-OECD data set. 
S -- The literature here is enormous.  The most influential modern econometric 
paper is by  Aahenfelter and  Pencavel (1969). 23 
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